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Mr. Lay, I've concluded that you're perhaps the most accomplished confidence man since
Charles Ponzi. I'd say you were a carnival barker, except that might not be fair to
carnival barkers. A carny will at least tell you up front that he's running a shell game.
You, Mr. Lay, were running what purported to be the seventh largest company in
America.
-Senator Peter Fitzgerald, addressing
former Enron chief executive Kenneth Lay,
February 13, 2002.

Temptation. It lies at the heart of financial swindles. The
promise of 50% returns in three months can lure thousands of
investors-so too can a stock that soars 500% in three years. But those
who are tempted are often skeptical. Before they invest, they want to
know how one can enjoy such supracompetitive returns. The answer
usually is a facially plausible story, though with a bit of mystery
attached. The mystery is often touted as the reason that the
investment opportunity is exclusive to the entrepreneur who
discovered it. It is what ensures that the gains are not competed away.
The classic case remains that of Charles Ponzi. While not a
very adept con artist-he was caught several times-in a six-month
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period in 1920, Ponzi convinced ten thousand investors to part with an
aggregate of $9.5 million.1 He promised amazing returns-50% in
ninety days. 2 As a testament to his financial wizardry, Ponzi often
paid off his investors in half the time he had initially promised.3 How
could he work such financial magic? Allegedly, Ponzi had discovered a
lucrative arbitrage opportunity in postal reply coupons. Postal reply
coupons allowed the sender of a letter to ensure that the recipient in
4
another country would be able to obtain sufficient postage to respond.
For example, a letter writer in America would purchase a reply coupon
here and send it along with a letter to a relative in another country,
say, Spain. The Spanish relative could then redeem the coupon for
Spanish stamps sufficient to send a reply.
Ponzi noticed a pricing discrepancy in the postal reply coupons.
One could buy a coupon in one country for, say, one penny, and
redeem it in another for six cents worth of stamps. 5 This opportunity
existed because exchange rates had been set in a postal convention in
1906, well before the outbreak of the Great War. The Great War
changed the relative value of many currencies, but the rates for postal
exchange coupons remained fixed. The failure to adjust the exchange
rates on postal reply coupons meant that a trader could buy a postal
reply coupon in a country where the relative value of the currency had
declined, redeem it in a country where the relative value of the
currency had increased, and turn a profit. There were, in theory, gains
to be had by exploiting government inertia.
But transaction costs limit any opportunity to profit from
arbitrage. Consider the steps necessary to exploit this state of affairs.
Money would be gathered in the United States. This money then had
to be converted into a foreign currency and put in the hands of an
agent in the appropriate foreign country. The agent would have to
buy the postal reply coupons in large quantity, although there were
limits on the number of coupons that could be bought at one time. The
agent then had to send the coupons back to the United States.
Another agent would have to redeem them. Given these elaborate
requirements, it is hard to imagine how anyone could purchase a
1.
See Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1923).
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.
See Foreign Treaty Multilateral, 35 Stat. 1639 (1907-1909).
5.
See Francis Russell, Bubble, Bubble-No Toil, No Trouble, AM. HERITAGE 74, 75 (Feb.
1973) ("He had conceived his scheme, so he said, when he received a business letter from Spain
enclosing a reply coupon ... which was exchangeable at any United States post office for a sixcent stamp. Ponzi was struck by the fact that the coupon in Spain had cost the buyer only the
equivalent of one cent."); Ponzi to Start Back in New York: Boston 'Wizard' Says He Needs Larger
Field and Will Come Here at Once, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1920, at 1 (same).
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sufficient number of reply coupons to support the millions of dollars
that Ponzi collected.
When pressed by potential investors on how he could overcome
these costs, Ponzi resorted to a favorite theme of the con artist-that
such information was a trade secret that could not be disclosed. 6 After
all, letting the cat out of the bag would allow his competitors to come
in and seize the opportunity he had discovered.7 A 50% return based
on a somewhat plausible story coupled with the allure of a trade secret
proved irresistible to over ten thousand investors who willingly gave
their money to Ponzi. At its high point, the "Ponzi Plan" as he called
8
it, was taking in $200,000 a day.
Of course, Ponzi's real trade secret was to never incur
transaction costs at all. He was able to avoid them because he never
bought a significant amount of postal reply coupons. 9 Rather, Ponzi
was running a simple pyramid scheme, with the money from later
investors being used to pay off earlier ones. 10 When the pyramid
collapsed, panic ensued as investors' dreams of fantastic riches turned
to fears of losing all that they had entrusted to Ponzi. Ponzi, of course,
lacked sufficient funds to return the money to those who were the last
to invest, let alone make good on his promised return. Ultimately, it
fell to the bankruptcy court to sort out the mess. All were clear,
however, on what was and what was not at stake in the court's
proceedings. The court's job was to apportion the loss among the
disappointed investors in Ponzi's operations. It had to determine what
assets were available and who had claims against these assets. These
are not easy questions; it took a decision by the Supreme Court to
12
decide exactly which funds belonged in the bankrupt estate.
One thing the bankruptcy court did not have to do, however,
was make any decision about how this group of assets should be
6.
'Mysecret is how I cash the coupons. I do not tell it to anybody. Let the United States
find it out if it can." Ponzi to Start Back in New York: Boston Wizard' Says He Needs Larger
Field and Will Come Here at Once, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1920, at 2; see also Mark C. Knutson,
The "PonziScheme," at http://www.mark-knutson.com (last visited Oct. 5, 2001).
7.
See DONALD H. DUNN, PONZI! THE BOSTON SWINDLER 52 (1975) (noting that Ponzi
refuses to disclose his method because "the DuPonts and Vanderbilts and Astors could come
charging in").
8.
See David Segal, Money for Nothing; Forget the Work Ethic: Mr. Ponzi Showed Us the
Real American Dream, WASH. POST, June 2, 1996, at C1.
9.
See id. ("Charles quickly discovered that a welter of red tape was swallowing his profit
margins. So he stopped buying coupons but sought out investors anyway.").
10. See Lowell v. Brown, 280 F. 193, 196 (D. Mass. 1922) ("His scheme was simply the old
fraud of paying the early comers profits out of the contributions of the later comers.").
11. See In re Ponzi, 268 F. 997, 1002-03 (D. Mass. 1920) (refusing to dismiss involuntary
bankruptcy petition against Ponzi).
12. See Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 7-14 (1923).
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deployed in the general economy. There was no firm to rescue. There
was simply a pile of cash with too many claims against it. This
particular aspect of Ponzi's failure would seem to distinguish it from
current corporate bankruptcy practice. Chapter 11 today is often
viewed as a forum where a decision has to be made as to how the
assets of a financially distressed firm should be used. These are real
firms with real assets. The goal of bankruptcy in this view is to
preserve the firm's going-concern value. 13 In contrast, there were no
assets in the Ponzi case other than the remaining cash the court could
collect. The major issue was whether earlier investors who had been
paid off should be forced to return their proceeds to the kitty and
settle for a pro rata share of the money they had originally turned
over to Ponzi. There was no contention that the money was worth
more if kept together rather than distributed to other parties. As such,
it would be tempting to conclude that Ponzi is a colorful figure who
reminds us of our tendency to be blinded by the prospect of easy
money, but offers little by way of analogy to today's bankruptcy
proceedings of publicly held firms.
As the quotation at the outset of this Article illustrates, the
recent collapse of Enron has revived the memory of Charles Ponzi. It
is easy to see why. Early investors in Enron who cashed out became
rich. Enron told its investors that it would continue to enjoy abovemarket returns indefinitely and that it was a firm that would live up
to the promise embedded in its high stock valuation relative to its
reported earnings. 14 At its peak, it traded at a price-earnings ratio of
fifty-five to one.' 5 Similar energy and trading firms had a PE ratio of a
quarter of this amount. 16
This situation should have raised questions-the same
questions raised by Ponzi's promise to increase an investor's money by

13. This view can be found in court cases, see, e.g., United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462
U.S. 198, 203 (1983); casebooks, see, e.g., ROBERT L. JORDAN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 633 (5th ed.
1999); treatises, see, e.g., MARK S. SCARBERRY ET AL., BUSINESS REORGANIZATION IN
BANKRUPTCY 1-2 (2d ed. 2001); and law review articles, see, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy
Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 344-52 (1993); Elizabeth Warren, The
Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437, 467-68 (1992).
14. See ENRON CORP., ENRON ANNUAL REPORT 2000 5 (2001), available at
http://www.enron.com/corp/investors/annuals/2OOO/ar2OOO.pdf
(last visited Aug. 27, 2002)
[hereinafter 2000 ANNUAL REPORT] ("Our performance and capabilities cannot be compared to a
traditional energy peer group. . . . Taken together, [the] markets [in which Enron competes]
present a $3.9 trillion opportunity for Enron, and we have just scratched the surface.").
15. See Ronnie J. Clayton et al., Enron: Market Exploitation and Correction, FIN.
DECISIONS, Spring 2002, at 13.
16. Indeed, Enron assured its investors that such a comparison was not apt. See 2000
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 5 ("Our performance and capabilities cannot be compared to a
traditional energy peer group.").

2002]

EASY LESSONS FROM ENRON

1791

half in a three-month period. Like Ponzi, Enron had answers. Enron
presented itself to the world as a market-maker, a firm that excelled
at creating new markets. 17 Market-makers, however, rarely enjoy
spectacular returns in the long run. To be sure, the enterprise of
creating new markets is a worthwhile endeavor. By organizing
markets, one enables buyers and sellers to find each other at low cost,
eliminating wasted resources through a reduction in transaction costs.
The entrepreneur who creates such a market can capture as profit a
fair portion of the benefit the initial buyers and sellers enjoy by
finding each other. Creating a market for the first time offers the
promise of a big one-time profit-the proverbial home run. Enron was
no Charles Ponzi; it actually made markets. Indeed, in at least the
energy markets where Enron first operated, they seem to have made a
good deal of money. Billions of dollars changed hands across the
various markets that Enron created.1 8
Over the long term, however, market-makers must be satisfied
with making a small profit on each trade. One cannot create a market
and keep it secret. Once the entrepreneur creates the market, others
can follow the example at little cost. As soon as buyers and sellers can
choose among a number of different market-makers, profits are
competed away. Despite this, Enron was able to convince investors
that it was special. It did not maintain that it would increase its
returns in the energy markets that it developed. After all, basic
economic principles suggest that, if anything, Enron could expect
decreasing returns in this aspect of its business. Rather, Enron sold
investors on the notion that it could translate its success to
international energy markets and to all commodities alike. 19 After
colonizing one market, Enron believed it could transport its expertise
to other, undeveloped markets. What worked in North America would
work in Europe, Asia, and South America. What worked in natural
gas and electricity should work in water, broadband, newsprint,

17. Enron's website stated, "It's difficult to define Enron in a sentence, but the closest we
come is this: we make commodity markets so that we can deliver physical commodities to our
customers
at
a
predictable
price."
I Enron
Corp.,
Who
We
Are,
at
http://www.enron.com/corp/whoweare.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2002).
18. See 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 9.
19. For example, see ENRON CORP., ENRON ANNUAL REPORT 1999 2 (2000), available at
http://www.enron.com/corp/investors/annuals/annual99/pdfs/1999_-Annual-Report.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2001) [hereinafter 1999 ANNUAL REPORT] ("What we've learned about natural gas
pipelines in the United States helps us build new natural gas markets in South America and
India. Our knowledge of optimizing capacity in energy networks will allow us to revolutionize the
bandwidth market."); 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 5 ("We have a proven business
concept that is eminently scalable in our existing businesses and adaptable enough to extend to
new markets.").
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metals, coal, crude oil, and steel. 20 The firms that had worked in these
areas for years simply had not seen the money that they were leaving
on the table.
This concept, while plausible in theory, did not work in
practice. Enron, however, endeavored to hide this truth from
investors, and perhaps even from itself. As a result, Enron is currently
best known as a company that cooked its books. In early October 2001,
before disclosing its bookkeeping improprieties, Enron's stock sold for
more than $30 a share. 2 1 Less than two months after these
shenanigans came to light, Enron filed for bankruptcy. 22
When Ponzi failed, there was no business to carry on. The only
issue was allocating the few remaining assets. Enron presents a
different sort of case. Unlike Ponzi's feigned use of postal reply
coupons, Enron ran a real business. Indeed, it was an innovator in
energy trading, a business that provided a valuable service and has
spawned many imitators.
It might seem that the job of the bankruptcy judge is to
preserve Enron's ongoing operations. Just as we would not tear apart
a railroad that had dishonest managers, we would not want to allow
Enron to be torn apart either. 23 Enron offers what would appear to be
a paradigmatic case for an old-fashioned Chapter 11 case. In this
Article, we show that this view is mistaken. In the end, what the
bankruptcy court can do for Enron (and indeed other firms in Chapter
11)24 is not much different from what it could do with the mess left by
Charles Ponzi. The bankruptcy court is well suited to the task of
penetrating the accounting miasma that enshrouds Enron. It may
take years, but eventually the court will clear away the obfuscation
created by Chewco, JEDI, the Raptors, and the other creatures of
accounting imagination that encircled Enron. Other decisions, such as
what to do with the assets that once comprised the nation's seventh
largest company, are best left to others. Some of Enron's assets left the
company prior to bankruptcy, others shortly after, and most of the rest
will soon be gone. It will be the new owners, not the bankruptcy court,
nor Enron's erstwhile managers, who decide the future use of these
20.

See 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 11-13.

21.

See PETER C. FUSARO & ROSS M. MILLER, WHAT WENT WRONG AT ENRON 119 (2002).

22. See Voluntary Pet., In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034, 2001 Extra LEXIS 159 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2001).
23. Indeed, we can trace the origins of modern Chapter 11 to the challenge of preserving
such railroads in the nineteenth century. See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION 48-70
(2001); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and the
ConceptualFoundationsof CorporateReorganizations,87 VA. L. REV. 921, 925-33 (2001).
24. We make this argument in Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of
Bankruptcy, STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
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assets. The market will decide what happens to Enron's business, not
the bankruptcy judge.
I. ENRON'S BUSINESS PLAN AND THE IDEA OF THE GOING-CONCERN
SURPLUS
Enron was nothing if not dynamic. Enron began in the mid1980s as a gas pipeline company owning the largest gas pipeline in the
United States.2 5 It was formed by the merger of two natural gas
pipeline companies, Houston Natural Gas and InterNorth. This
merger left Enron with $4.2 billion in debt. 26 Using additional debt
financing, Enron soon acquired other energy-related assets, including
power plants. 27 In 1989, after deregulation of the gas industry, it
opened GasBank, an energy trading operation that allowed consumers
of natural gas to secure reliable sources of supply at a predictable
price. Five years later, it created a market for electricity. These two
markets operated at the wholesale level. By the late 1990s, most of
Enron's earnings came from businesses in which it had not engaged
ten years earlier. 28 In a decade and a half, Enron evolved from an oldeconomy firm centered on hard assets to a new-economy enterprise
centered on a scalable strategy of creating markets where none had
existed previously. 29 In the year before its stunning collapse, Enron
touted that its most valuable asset was its people and their ability to
apply Enron's business strategy far and wide. 3 0

25. See Loren Steffy & Adam Levy, Enron's Original Sins: Lies Began Long Before Current
Crisis, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Mar. 20, 2002, available at LEXIS, Bloomberg-All Bloomberg News
("In 1986, . . . Enron... owned the largest U.S. gas pipeline.").
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. See WILLIAM POWERS, JR., SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION 36 (Feb. 1, 2002), available at No. 0116034, 2002 Extra LEXIS 45, at *53.
29. Not only did Enron expressly style itself as a "new-economy" firm, see 1999 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 19, at 2 ("When you define a New Economy company, you define Enron."),
but its annual reports draw heavily on the new-economy lexicon. See, e.g., 2000 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 14, at 2 ("[r]obust networks of strategic assets"); id. at 3 ("integrating EnronOnline
into all our businesses as an accelerator"); id. at 4 ("network connectivity"); id. at 5 ("leverage");
1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 2 ("knowledge-based company," "global networks,"
'What you own is not as important as what you know," "constant innovation," "connectivity," and
"strategic contractual relationships"); id. at 4 ("first mover advantage" and "leverage"); id. at 5
("intellectual capital"); ENRON CORP., ENRON ANNUAL REPORT 1998 3 (1999), available at
http://www.enron.com/corp/inves-tors/annuals/annual98/pdfs/1998-Annual-Report.pdf
(last
visited Aug. 27, 2001) [hereinafter 1998 ANNUAL REPORT] ("business platform").
30. See 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 5 ("We have metamorphosed from an assetbased pipeline and power generating company to a marketing and logistics company whose
biggest assets are its well-established business approach and its innovative people.").
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In both the natural gas and electricity markets, Enron hit it
big. Deregulation allowed the natural gas industry to change both the
way in which natural gas was delivered and the structure of the
contracts among the various market participants.3 1 Enron was well
positioned to take advantage of these changes. It knew where
overcapacity existed and where it did not. Its computer system and
highly skilled traders allowed it to identify and enter favorable
transactions. At the same time, deregulation made utilities more
sensitive to price fluctuations than they had been in the past and,
hence, more willing to enter into transactions with Enron. In addition,
deregulation naturally led to lower prices. Therefore, by locking
customers into a fixed price for natural gas, Enron stood to gain as
deregulation became more widespread. Enron's success in the natural
gas market coupled with its business in the wholesale electricity
market allowed it to capture a large share of the wholesale electricity
trading market when that market was deregulated. By the mid-1990s,
Enron dominated the domestic wholesale markets in natural gas and
electricity. There were few other players in this field at the outset, and
none possessed Enron's knowledge of the marketplace.
As the market for energy trading became thicker, Enron
expected to ultimately reduce its commitment to capital-intensive
assets such as power plants. 32 Indeed, in the fifteen years from 1985 to
2000, its pipeline capacity decreased from 37,000 miles to 25,000
miles. 33 Its ability to shed these assets, however, did not result in
higher profits. If Enron did not need hard assets, then neither did its
competitors. The ability to maintain a trading operation without hard
assets facilitates entry into the energy-trading business. Deepening of
a market lowers profits. Trading firms in mature markets simply do
not receive the returns that Enron did when it first developed the
electricity and natural gas markets. At this point, Enron could have
34
simply accepted this steady flow of less spectacular profits.

31. See generally Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 50
Fed. Reg. 42,408, FERC Order No. 436 (Oct. 18, 1985).
32. See 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 9 ("We continually assess the necessity of
adding or owning assets in a region ....
[A]s liquidity increases, asset ownership may no longer
be necessary .... The result is the same earnings power with less invested capital.").
33. Id. at 18 (reporting interstate pipeline capacity to be 25,000 miles); Enron Corp., Fast
Facts for the Media: Company History & Milestones, at http://www.enron.comlcorp/pressroom
(last visited Aug. 28, 2002) (stating that Enron owned 37,000 miles of gas pipeline at the time of
its formation in 1985).
34. Indeed, Enron itself predicted only "stable earnings and cash flows" from its most
established business-the business on which it was founded-transportation of natural gas. 2000
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 22.
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Enron's managers, however, were not content with standing
pat. The lesson that they took from their success in energy markets
was not that they were in the right place at the right time, but that
they had discovered a strategy for reducing risks that could be
transplanted to other areas. Enron sought to expand in two ways. It
attempted to expand internationally on what it had done in the
United States by acquiring assets in Asia, Europe, South America,
and the Caribbean. Trading markets were to follow. 35 Enron
envisioned itself dominating the wholesale market for energy
worldwide in the same way that it towered over the domestic
36
market.
More provocatively, Enron believed that its success in
wholesale energy could be replicated in other domestic markets, many
of which were unrelated to energy. Enron's managers believed that
what they had done for the wholesale energy market they could do for
the retail market. In late 1996 they created Enron Energy Services to
provide energy management services to business customers. 37 To
illustrate the potential demand for this service, consider a department
store chain. It competes with other chains based on selection and price
of its merchandise. It does not want to have its success turn on its
energy costs. Enron's trading operations would allow the chain to
enter into a long-term contract for up to ten years where its supply of
electricity was secured and its costs fixed. 38
Enron's vision was to expand this model across all commodities
and other risks that a firm must manage. Simply put, Enron decided
to lead the way in solving a problem that entrepreneurs have faced for
as long as commerce has existed: how to contend with fluctuating
commodity prices and other risks over which they have no control.
Retailers have to contend with fluctuating energy needs; farmers can
do nothing about the weather; airlines can do nothing to change the
price of jet fuel; and importers can do nothing about exchange rates.
Businesses sometimes succeed and sometimes fail for reasons that
have nothing to do with the competence of their managers. Firms
often file for bankruptcy because their most important supplier or
customer filed before them. Enron promised to change all this. As it
boasted on its website, Enron would "make markets in ...industries

35. See 1998 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 14-16.
36. This theme dominates Enron's 1998 Letter to the Shareholders, which begins with three
words: "Global energy franchise." Id. at 3.
37.

See id. at 34.

38.

Id. at 19.
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that need a more efficient way to deliver commodities and manage
risk."3 9
To be sure, all entrepreneurs must take risks. As Chaucer
observed: "Nothing ventured, nothing gained. '40 But entrepreneurs
want to choose their risks and bear the ones they believe they can
control. They want to focus on areas where they believe they have a
comparative advantage. For example, Ford Motor Company lost a
billion dollars in the market for palladium. 41 While Ford needed
palladium to make cars, Ford had no comparative advantage in timing
the market for this rare metal. Enron's dream was to prevent
situations like this. Enron would make it possible for companies to
eliminate such risks by supplying commodities, making markets in
them, and strategically investing in the firms and resources needed to
provide them. Ultimately, Enron might promise to protect the retail
chain that wanted to fix its energy costs not merely if energy prices
went up, but also if unusual weather increased its demand for energy.
Weather derivatives and other exotic financial instruments allow an
intermediary like Enron to make these promises and transfer risk to
42
others.
In creating these various markets, Enron attempted to mimic
the strategy that it had used in the wholesale energy business. 43 The
first step was to acquire assets. Just as they could assure liquidity in
their energy contracts by buying power plants, they could acquire
other hard assets to reinforce the other derivative contracts they
created. 44 Enron became the seventh largest producer of newsprint. It
built fiber-optic networks, acquired firms that dealt in precious
metals, and bought a water company. 45 It made strategic investments
in start-up ventures built around these commodities. The fiber-optic
cable created a demand for routers and other pieces of hardware.

39. Enron Corp., Who We Are, at http://www.enron.com/corp/whoweare.htm
Feb. 13, 2002).
40.

(last visited

See GREGORY Y. TITELMAN, RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF POPULAR PROVERBS AND

SAYINGS 250 (2d ed. 2000).
41. See Norihiko Shirouzo et al., Driving Lessons: Beyond Explorer Woes, Ford Misses Key
Turns in Buyers, Technology, WALL ST J., Jan. 14, 2002, at Al.
42. Enron began its weather derivatives market in 1997. See Enron Leads the Weather
Pack, TREASURY & RISK MGMT., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 17.
43. See 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 2 (noting that "the skills and resources we
used to transform the energy business are proving to be equally valuable in other businesses");
2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 3 (stating that "[w]e are extending Enron's proven
business approach to other markets").
44. See 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 2 ("Assets form the foundation of network
businesses that sell up and down the value chain.").
45. See 1998 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 4.
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Enron invested in these items, and invested big. 46 Similarly, the new
capacity created a new outlet for movies. Enron took advantage of this
opportunity to invest in a start-up venture that would supply movies
on demand on the fiber-optic cables that it was building and that its
47
trading operations were making accessible.
Enron also created financial derivatives. Enron's bankruptcy
contracts helped those whose business depended heavily on one of its
customers staying out of Chapter 11. To see the attraction of such a
contract, consider a shopping center owner that leases its largest store
to a retailer. The shopping center faces the risk that the retailer will
file for bankruptcy and use the Code's inefficient rules to reject the
lease and redistribute the nonbankruptcy rights of the lessor to the
other creditors. A contract with Enron could provide for a payout in
the event that such a bankruptcy petition took place.
As an example of Enron's vision, consider the following. During
the summer of 2000, Enron helped a zinc producer in the Northwest
shut down its operations for six weeks and sell the power it would
otherwise have used to a buyer who needed it more. 48 Enron then
49
provided a financial derivative to lock in the sale at a fixed price.
Enron also provided zinc from its metals subsidiary so that the zinc
producer could meet preexisting obligations. 50 Such transactions make
everyone better off and put resources to their highest valued use.
Enron created value in situations such as these.
Enron's business plan rested on two crucial ideas. First, it
assumed that creating markets that helped other firms eliminate risk
required owning hard assets and strategically investing in these
industries in addition to making a market in derivatives associated
with the risk.5 1 During the late 1990s, this idea had considerable
currency. The great fortunes in cyberspace were to be won with the
right combination of "bricks and clicks." For instance, Webvan aspired
to transform the world of grocery shopping by interconnecting
warehouses and fleets of trucks with sophisticated software that
allowed grocery delivery within the half-hour time slot the customer

46. Enron's annual report listed the cost of its fiber-optic network and equipment at $839
million. See 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 32.
47. Rebecca Smith, Blockbuster, Enron Agree to Movie Deal, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2000, at
A3, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 3037214.
48. 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 12.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Such ownership, however, need not last forever. As Enron created markets and learned
how they operated, it eventually could shed assets, as it had done in its energy business.
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wanted. 52 The cost of the infrastructure created a barrier to entry, and
the returns to scale were substantial. By becoming the first mover in
such a market, the potential profits were enormous. The synergy
between any particular combination of "bricks and clicks" might
exist. 53 Or it might not.
Second, Enron assumed that its success in the natural gas and
electricity markets gave it a comparative advantage in creating
markets elsewhere, 54 but it turns out that Enron's success in energy
may have been smaller than its managers thought. Enron marked its
contracts to market in environments in which liquid markets did not
exist. The computer models used to extrapolate a, "market price"
proved wildly optimistic. In addition to inflating its success in a way
that affected the investors who bought the company's shares, Enron's
financial modeling may have also misled managers.
Even if it had been successful in the energy market, Enron's
success may have stemmed not from its ability to make markets, but
rather from industry-specific expertise. For example, Enron's pipeline
and power businesses gave it knowledge of where excess capacity lay.
When it created markets in water, broadband, coal, and steel, it
lacked similar knowledge. Finally, Enron's success came in two
markets-natural gas and electricity-that were moving from
regulation to deregulation. 55 Whether substantial opportunities
existed in other markets not undergoing this transition was unclear.
To implement its business strategy, Enron, as it existed at the
end of 2001, combined three separate types of businesses. First, it
owned a variety of hard assets, including power plants and natural
gas pipelines. Second, it ran trading operations in which it made
markets in many different commodities and financial derivatives, and
advised businesses about how they could take advantage of these
instruments. Third, it was a venture capital investor in many high52.

See RANDALL E. STROSS, EBoYS: THE FIRST INSIDE ACCOUNT OF VENTURE CAPITALISTS

AT WORK 30-36 (2000). Immediately after Webvan's IPO, it had a market capitalization of more
than $8 billion. Id. at 286.
53.

See, e.g., MCKINSEY & COMPANY, BRICKS AND CLICKS: WINNING IN THE NEW ECONOMY

(July 2000), available at http://retail.mckinsey.com/pdf/speechinternetworld.pdf (last visited
Oct. 3, 2002); Stuart Elliott, Technology Briefing. E-Commerce; Bricks and Clicks Convergence?,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2000, at CIO.
54. See 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 5 ("We have a proven business concept that
is eminently scalable in our existing businesses and adaptable enough to extend to new
markets."); 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 2 ("We are clearly a knowledge-based
company, and the skills and resources we used to transform the energy business are proving to
be equally valuable in other businesses."); id. at 5 ("The fundamental skills and expertise we use
to develop energy and communications solutions can be applied to many situations that inhibit
our customers' profits and growth.").
55.

See 1998 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 29, at 3.
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technology and energy-related ventures, both in this country and
abroad. Moreover, Enron viewed these separate businesses as part of
a single plan. The venture capital investments were designed to spur
development of hard assets, which would then serve as the base on
which it would build its trading operations.
Few companies attempt to combine such disparate activities. It
would be as if Exxon combined with the New York Stock Exchange
and a Silicon Valley venture capital fund such as Sequoia Capital.
Running each of these units effectively tends to require different types
of management strategies. Managing hard assets such as pipelines
and utilities requires managers who know how to keep things running
and minimize costs. Those who sell commodities at market prices get
their profit from lowering costs. Market-makers require transparent
operations-everything turns on counterparties believing that they
are dealing with an entity that will honor its promises. Strategic
investing requires industry-specific expertise and an ability to close
deals and cut losses. Each of these businesses ordinarily operates
under radically different governance and capital structures. Enron's
strategy of putting all three operations under one roof makes sense
only if a way could be found to manage them at a low cost.
In fact, such a mixture of business operations may be highly
toxic. Market-makers can only make markets to the extent that their
counterparties believe they will fulfill their promises. If any threat
exists that the market-maker will not be able to come through on
promises made, the market will evaporate. In Enron's case, its
contracts stretched out for years.
Some of its natural gas and
electricity contracts committed Enron to supply these commodities for
over two decades. 56 People enter into such long-term relationships only
when they have reason to believe the other side will be there in the
future.
Venture capitalists, in contrast, swing for the fences. In a good
year, most of their investments will fail. To be sure, there is the
promise of extraordinary returns, but there is also the specter of
extraordinary losses. Successful venture capitalists depend on great
returns in a handful of successes to counterbalance the losses they
incur in most of their investments. In its venture investing, Enron was
doing more than looking to score big in a handful of cases. It was
looking to support its other operations. This self-interest in success
could well cloud the decision about whether to fund a venture and
when to terminate it. Combining venture activity and market-making

56.

See 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 38.
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activity, far from being a source of synergy, might reduce Enron's
value as a going concern.
Enron identified its business model as a "network" where the
trading operations allowed it to "leverage" its investments in assets.
Enron believed that others could not compete with it because it was
the only competitor able to combine trading operations with hard
assets. Yet its own experience suggested that combining these two
components was becoming less important. For example, Enron's
annual report boasted that over time it would become less reliant on
its own assets in servicing its customers. 57 But rather than a source of
pride, this goal should have sounded an alarm. To the extent that
owning the hard assets is less necessary, the less value Enron has as a
going concern and the more plausible it becomes that others can
compete with it in the market. There is no reason to believe that
Enron had access to contracts with third parties that could not be
58
replicated by others.
If transaction costs go down, a firm can stabilize its costs by
entering into different contracts with a number of firms. It no longer
needs a single firm such as Enron. Even if it wants to deal with one
firm, a single intermediary who is neither a market-maker nor a
supplier can bundle the appropriate contracts and sell them. The
technological advance that Enron relied upon to create its markets
was a dramatic decline in transaction costs, but such a decline also
reduces any advantage Enron had over competitors. The easier it is for
others to compete with Enron, the less value Enron has above and
beyond the value of its assets. 59 The same force that made Enron
possible also capped its value as a going concern.
57. See id. at 9 ("We continually assess the necessity of adding or owning assets in a
region.... [Als liquidity increases, asset ownership may no longer be necessary."); id. at 24 ("In
North America, Enron expects to complete the sale of five of its peaking power plants located in
the Midwest and its interstate natural gas pipeline. In each case, market conditions, such as
increased liquidity, have diminished the need to own physical assets.").
58. Here is where Enron comes perilously close to Ponzi's invocation of a trade secret.
Enron's annual reports are replete with references to Enron's intellectual capital but are sketchy
at best as to the exact nature of that capital. See, e.g., id. at 3 ("We are extending Enron's proven
business approach to other markets, and integrating EnronOnline [its computer trading system]
into all our businesses as an accelerator."); 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 2 ("Enron
has been and always will be the consummate innovator because of our extraordinary people. It is
our intellectual capital-not only our physical assets-that makes us Enron. Move our assets to
another company, and the results would be markedly different."); id. at 5 ("We recognize that our
intellectual capital is our most important asset, and we cherish it."); 1998 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 29, at 4 ("We have the people and the skills in place to widen our strong competitive
advantage, and we think it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for any other company to
replicate our overall capabilities in the foreseeable future.").
59. As we explain in detail elsewhere, this is a corollary of Ronald Coase's observation
seventy years ago that transactions are brought inside a firm when it is cheaper for the firm to
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When Enron filed for bankruptcy, it,owned thousands of miles
of gas pipelines and fiber-optic cable. It was one of the largest
wholesalers of coal and the seventh largest producer of newsprint. It
owned power plants all over the world, some completed, some still
under development. Even if it had made astute investments in all
these areas (and there is much to suggest that it did not),60 there
seems to have been little synergy between these assets. There is no
reason to think that these assets have a greater value in Enron's
hands than in the hands of some other party.61 The ability to enter
into contracts for any of these commodities and the ability to form
networks through contracts made it less valuable to have a collection
of physical assets under the control of any particular firm.
We come then to the first easy lesson of Enron. It is all too
easy, inside of bankruptcy and out, to assume that any particular
business has an enormous going-concern surplus. Much is lost if a
firm is shut down and its assets are sold off piecemeal. But the extent
to which a firm as a whole has value above and beyond the sum of the
highest value of its discrete assets is easy to overestimate. In a world
in which transaction costs are rapidly declining, the value created by
simply bringing assets into the firm is likely to decrease over time.
Enron may provide an especially vivid illustration. Indeed, as we have
noted above, Enron's business plan was to make money by reducing
transaction costs. Enron made it continuously cheaper for others to
buy and sell all the things for which it was a market-maker. But as
these costs declined, Enron's own ability to profit as a market-maker
declined as well. The benefits that arise when transaction costs
decline and markets come into being are commonly called "consumer
surplus." The name is no accident. When markets work correctly, it is
the buyers who enjoy the benefits rather than the intermediaries that
made the trade possible. The huge valuations the stock market placed
upon Enron (and other similar intermediaries who brought us the
"new economy") may reflect a failure to acknowledge this basic
principle.

control the assets rather than contract for them. Ronald H..Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA 386 (1937); see Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 23.
60. Enron designed the Raptors and other similar instruments to ensure that, at least
temporarily, declines in its investments would not be recognized on its bottom line. See POWERS,
supra note 28, at 97-99. The ultimate collapse of these structures was due in large part to the
precipitous drop in the value of Enron's investments.
61. As we discuss below, Enron's disparate groups are in the process of being sold off
separately. See infra Parts III & IV. The market thus seems to value the sum of the parts as
greater than the whole.
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II. ENRON'S TRADING SYSTEM AND PRESERVING DEDICATED ASSETS
Enron's hard assets, such as its power plants and pipelines,
appear to have no more value in Enron's hands than they would in the
hands of another firm. The search for going-concern value must
therefore begin elsewhere. Did Enron own other kinds of assets that
did have their highest valued use inside of Enron? The most
significant asset designed and dedicated to Enron's activities was its
trading and information infrastructure. It provided real-time
information on everything that affected the value of the goods and
services in the markets it made, from the weather to the latest news.
The system was operated and maintained by a group of several
hundred highly talented traders and information specialists. Enron
claimed that this group generated $2 billion in profits in the year 2000
alone. 62 Indeed, this group was responsible for 90% of the profits
63
Enron reported for that year.
We know now that Enron made less on its operations than it
reported. How much less or indeed whether they generated any profit
at all is now unclear. Enron marked to market its profits from the
trading operations, even when the contracts (such as a contract with a
single entity to provide power or electricity) were one of a kind and
extended over a decade. 64 These contracts represented a discounted
cash flow derived from financial modeling rather than hard numbers
based on the same contracts in liquid markets. Moreover, Enron was a
market-maker in many areas in which its employees were also the
principal traders. Many contracts were executed between two Enron
traders. By making each of its traders a stand-alone profit center,
Enron's compensation system may have created an environment in
which phantom profits appeared through trades that Enron traders
made with each other. When the dust settles, it may well be that
Enron's vaunted technology had little value.
Yet even if we were to take Enron's profit numbers at face
value, it is far from clear that Enron's trading system is a source of
large going-concern surplus given the emergence of other trading
systems by competitors. Information systems like Enron's are public
goods. The cost of providing additional consumers access to any
system is quite small. Whether a particular system has value does not
depend upon whether it provides valuable information, but whether it
62. See 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 21.
63. See id. at 21 (reporting that in 2000 Wholesale Services had income of $2,260,000 and
Enron as a whole had income of $2,482,000).
64. See id. at 38 (listing a range from six to twenty-nine years as maximum terms of risk
management contracts for various commodities and financial products).
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can compete effectively with other information and trading operations.
A system may be very good, but in a competitive market, it may have
little value if it is not quite as good as other systems, or if it offers a
comparable product at a higher price.
One also has to identify the components that give any system
value. Much of the information is real-time information that has value
only because it is constantly updated. It may take a large investment
in resources to maintain the system but comparatively little to
establish it at the outset. Knowing the price at the close of business
the previous day is not at all difficult, but maintaining an information
system that provides the price of a commodity in real time is costly.
For the system to have value, the increased value one gets from
constantly updated prices must be greater than the cost of gathering
such information and making it available. Even if it is worthwhile to
maintain a real-time system, there is no reason to believe that Enron's
system could be run more cheaply than anyone else's. To the extent
that Enron's system possessed the information by virtue of hiring a
large number of individuals to acquire and enter this data into the
system, others could do the same thing at the same cost.
Enron's computer system, of course, did not operate itself.
Much of the value of Enron's operations is attributable to the traders
and researchers who maintained the system. Few possess the skills
needed to execute derivative contracts, to hedge risks, and to assess
the overall risk of a portfolio. Those who worked at Enron may have
possessed such skills and thus may have added value to its trading
and information systems. Here again, however, these assets do not by
themselves necessarily contribute to the value of this operation. First,
we do not know whether the traders as a group created any value for
Enron at all. The extent of Enron's liabilities is not known. Enron's
traders may, in the end, have been able to enter into the number of
transactions they did only because they could not estimate the value of
these transactions properly. It is very easy for a trader to sell $100
dollar bills for $95, especially in an environment in which the internal
control mechanisms allow the trader to book a $10 profit on the deal.
Put simply, the enormous volume of Enron's trading operations may
reflect no more than the ability of other traders to profit at Enron's
expense.
Even if Enron's traders were in fact highly skilled, we are still
left with the question of whether they added value to Enron. To retain
such traders in a competitive environment, Enron needed to pay them.
If the traders could employ their expertise in other firms as readily as
at Enron, they-not Enron-would enjoy the value of their skills.
What began as a firm-specific asset-the ability to trade on Enron's
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proprietary system, may have morphed into an industry-specific onethe ability to trade on any number of trading systems. Whereas Enron
could garner much of the surplus of firm-specific skills, it would
capture considerably less of industry-specific ones. For firm-specific
skills, the surplus created is shared between the employee and the
firm. For industry-specific skills, the surplus is up for bid, with the
employee able to take her skills to the highest bidder.
Hence, the value of Enron's trading operation available to its
creditors and other investors did not lie in the skill of individual
traders. Instead, its value, if any exists, must be the unique
combination of assets-the marriage of the traders and the
proprietary trading system. If so, traders who moved to operations at
other firms might not be able to do as much or be as successful,
because their skills would not mesh as effectively with the system and
people at the other firm. But such synergies tend to disappear as
markets evolve anyway.
This is the second lesson of Enron. One should not assume that
specialized assets generate going-concern value. In the case of cuttingedge markets, firm-specific assets often become industry-specific. The
traders who created new markets at Enron can work anywhere. They
have valuable skills, but these skills do not belong to Enron. Assets
dedicated to a particular enterprise, such as Enron's computer system
and the team that ran it, may lose their value in the wake of
competition.
III. COHERENT CONTROL RIGHTS AND ENRON
Enron's basic business plan-combining contracting over
commodities with supplying the physical asset itself-created a large
network of interrelated entities. 65 Moreover, tax rules made it
attractive to create elaborate vehicles to minimize corporate tax, while
accounting rules created the temptation to use such vehicles to foist
things off the balance sheet that investors did not like to see, like debt
and losses. Although these vehicles minimized taxes and allowed the
reporting of ever-increasing profits, they simultaneously made it more
difficult for those in charge to assess exactly how any given Enron
division was performing. As the old saying goes, one advantage of
consistently telling the truth is that it is much easier to keep your
story straight. One of the worst things a decisionmaker can do is
65. Enron had approximately four thousand subsidiaries. See Motion of the Debtors
Pursuant to Rule 1015(B) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure for Joint Administration
of the Cases, In re Enron, No. 01-16034, 2001 Extra LEXIS 304, at *2, (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10,

2001).
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pollute her own sources of information. The sheer complexity of
understanding what Enron did and did not own undermined the
business model premised upon the idea that a firm that combines the
trading function with the delivery function enjoys a comparative
advantage.
The transactions that ultimately precipitated Enron's collapse
complicate the current reorganization proceeding. Consider, for
example, the "Raptor III" transaction. 66 Enron created a subsidiary,
The New Power Company ("TNPC"), in which it owned a 75%
interest. 67 TNPC was to provide energy to retail customers. Enron
then engaged in a set of transactions designed to allow it to report
large gains from its investment in TNPC. It sold a portion of its stock
of TNPC to a special purpose entity, dubbed "Hawaii 125-0," that it
created with an outside institutional investor. 68 At the same time,
Enron entered into a series of swap arrangements with Hawaii 125-0
that left most of the economic risks and rewards associated with the
TNPC stock with Enron itself. These transactions taken as a whole
allowed Enron to book a large gain on the TNPC stock transferred to
Hawaii 125-0.
Enron, however, sought to ensure that its future income
statements would not have to account for any losses based on its
promise to guard Hawaii 125-0 against a decrease in the value of the
TNPC stock. Thus, it looked for a way to "lock in" its gain on the sale
to Hawaii 125-0.
Enter Raptor III and LJM2, a limited partnership run by
Enron's Chief Financial Officer. Enron used a limited liability
company it had previously created--"Porcupine"-in which it was the
principal shareholder. 69 LJM2 contributed $30 million in equity to
Porcupine, but part of the deal was that LJM2 would receive $39.5
million from Porcupine before Porcupine could engage in any hedging
transactions. The only other assets of Porcupine were 24 million
shares of TNPC stock that came from Enron. Porcupine gave Enron a
note for $259 million for these shares; the price for the shares was
based on the price that Hawaii 125-0 had paid for its shares months
earlier. Enron was in the final phase of readying for an IPO that
would price the TNPC stock significantly higher than the price that
Hawaii 125-0 had paid.
66. Further details of the Raptor and other similar transactions can be found in the special
master's report in Enron's bankruptcy case. See First Interim Report of Neal Batson, CourtAppointed Examiner, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034, 3-4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2002).
67. POWERS, supra note 28, at 114-18.
68. Id. at 115.
69. Id.

1806

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1787

One week later, the IPO of TNPC took place. 70 On the same
day, Porcupine paid LJM2 its promised $39.5 million. Porcupine then
entered into a swap on 18 million shares of TNPC under which
Porcupine, in essence, promised to reimburse Enron to the extent that
the price of TNPC fell below $21 a share. But, the only asset that
Porcupine had to back up this obligation was stock in TNPC itself. If
the stock went down enough, Enron would take the fall. Porcupine
would be unable to pay off the note that it had given to Enron for the
24 million shares, and it would not be able to honor its promise to
reimburse Enron for the decline in price below $21 a share on the
hedged 18 million shares. Enron gained nothing other than an ability
to hide its finances from investors for losses over the short term, and
71
for this facade it paid LJM2 $9.5 million.
Numerous transactions such as this make it very hard to put a
value on Enron. Enron may have claims against Porcupine, LJM2,
and the principal owner of LJM2, its erstwhile Chief Financial Officer,
but the legal status of these claims is uncertain. The economic value of
these claims is also cloudy because it is unclear whether any of the
affected parties have the resources to fully satisfy their obligations.
These transactions make it nearly impossible to ascertain the
value of Enron's principal asset, its energy trading system. The value
of the trading system depends on the ability of the market-maker to
settle its contracts. Raptor III and its brethren made it impossible for
any party to ascertain what Enron was really worth. This opacity sets
Enron apart from the typical bankruptcy of publicly traded firms that
we see today. Many large modern Chapter 11 cases begin only after
those in control have already decided to sell the firm's assets. Shortly
after bankruptcy is filed, the bankruptcy judge oversees the sale of the
firm's assets and ensures that the assets may be transferred free of
the contention among those who have competing claims. 72 For
example, when American Airlines agreed to buy TWA last year,
Chapter 11 was initiated only to consummate the speedy sale. 73 TWA's
principal assets ended up in American's hands roughly three months
after TWA filed for bankruptcy. Divvying up the cash took over a
74
year.

70. Id. at 117.
71. Id. at 118.
72. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 24 (manuscript at 57-61).
73. See Susan Carey, American Airlines' TWA FinancingPlanIs Approved, Although Rivals
Cry Foul, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2001, at A3, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2852465.
74. TWA's plan was confirmed in June 2002. See In re Trans World Airlines, Order
Confirming Joint Liquidating Plan of Reorganization of the Debtors and the Official Committee
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In many of these cases, control rights over assets have been
parceled to ensure that all decisions about asset deployment are made
outside of bankruptcy.7 5 In the case of a large firm in bankruptcy, we
find that, at the moment Chapter 11 is filed, a revolving credit facility
is already in place that entrusts decisionmaking authority to a single
entity. 76 This entity will often step in and replace management. It will
make the necessary operational decisions before Chapter 11 begins.
Where synergy among assets exists, they will be kept; where the
market places as high or higher value on the assets than does the
firm, they will be sold. By the time the firm enters bankruptcy, the
process of shutting down or selling off operations is well underway.
The bankruptcy process itself has little to do with making decisions
about how the assets are used. Bankruptcy is used only because, as a
legal matter, it provides a cheaper mechanism for assuring the buyer
77
clean title than state law.
Modern firms may have complicated and dynamic divisions of
control rights. These rights are nevertheless coherent in the sense
that they represent a bargained agreement among investors about
who should exercise control over the firm's assets in any particular
state of the world. 78 Indeed, in the case of many modern, new-economy
firms, the enterprise is designed so that the firm enters bankruptcy
only after all the economic opportunities associated with the assets
have been exhausted. Webvan is a recent example. It filed for Chapter
11 only after its professional managers and venture capital backers
concluded that it would never be able to maintain a positive cash
flow. 79 Chapter 11 was only used as a way to ensure an orderly
80
liquidation.
Some cases can arise, particularly those where conditions can
change rapidly or those that involve fraud, where the control rights
are no longer allocated in a coherent manner. Enron is such a case.
Assets were placed in various entities to avoid taxes or to make the

of Unsecured Creditors Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, No. 0100056 (Bankr. D. Del. June 14, 2002).
75. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 24 (manuscript at 43-57).
76. See id. (manuscript at 55-56).
77. See id. (manuscript at 58-59).
78. WorldCom's capital structure was arranged so that, should the unthinkable happen and
WorldCom be unable to pay its debts, the decision as whether to keep WorldCom's assets
together or sell them off rested in the hands of its bankers. See Mitchell Pacelle & Carrick
Mollenkamp, WorldCom's Banks Face Big Choice, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2002, at A3. Only when
the banks could not find a ready buyer did the firm file for bankruptcy. See Simon Romero &
Riva D. Atlas, WorldCom's Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at Al.
79. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 24 (manuscript at 50).
80. Id.
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books look favorable. Added to the maze of entities in the Enron
family is the problem of fraud. The introduction of tortious conduct for
which the firm is liable further compounds the problem, as claims
against the assets may be both unliquidated and contingent. This lack
of coherent control rights does create some work for the bankruptcy
judge.
When the firm's assets are hard to identify and are locked in
different related entities where individuals have different rights,
matters are complicated. The appropriate disposition of assets may be
unclear, and different dispositions may have different distributional
consequences. Unwinding various derivative transactions can have
the effect of terminating the option value of those who have an
ownership interest in them. This possibility creates disparate
incentives and controversy among investors, all of whom have an
interest in recovering as much as possible individually.
With respect to many of Enron's traditional assets, however,
the lack of coherent control rights may be of little moment. The
revenue stream a utility will generate is largely independent of who
controls it, at least during the initial months when the asset still
resides inside the firm being reorganized. Control rights over the dayto-day operations of these assets will remain in the hands of
employees who take care of them. Even if decisions need to be made
(such as replacing the management team), those decisions usually do
not create controversies among investors, who share a common
interest in maximizing the value of the firm.
Here, then, is the third lesson of Enron. The basic decisions in
a reorganization ought to begin with an examination of the way in
which control rights are allocated. Their coherence, or lack of
coherence, tells us how much work the bankruptcy judge must do.
When the rights are coherently allocated, or the assets are
conventional and easy to identify, there is little work for the
bankruptcy judge. Often, the judge need only follow the lead of those
who have bargained for control. These individuals have greater
knowledge and incentives to ensure that assets are put to their
highest valued use. In such cases, judicial work, to the extent it exists
at all, involves allocating the assets among competing claimants and
vindicating bankruptcy's prohibitions on preferences and fraudulent
conveyances.
IV. MARKET SALES AND THE ENRON ASSETS

We come now to one more lesson of Enron. Modern Chapter 11
practice, unlike that of twenty years ago, relies on the market. Even
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where dedicated assets exist and control 'rights are in disarray,
modern bankruptcy judges often maintain control of the assets and
take the necessary steps to preserve their value for only as long as it
takes to find a buyer. For example, bankruptcy judges today have the
ability to approve short-term contracts to keep a business together
and the ability to sell the assets as soon as buyers can be found.8 1 In
Enron's case, the bankruptcy judge approved the retention of the
traders and others for a period of weeks even though they were only
coming to work to play- poker with each other. 82 As those in control
searched for a reliable counterparty to run the trading operation,
Enron's traders needed to be kept on board.
A trading operation in a rapidly changing economy cannot
remain dormant for long. The fate of the trading operation could not
wait until Enron's financial affairs were sorted out. Within a few
weeks of the bankruptcy petition, the bankruptcy judge conducted an
auction in which the winning bidder promised to pay only a portion of
the profits of the operation for some period of years.8 3 In a different
world, where the firm was not clouded by improprieties, a prevailing
bidder would have been required to produce some amount of hard
cash. But Enron no longer possessed the credibility needed to be a
market-maker and could not engage in any transactions at all,
rendering it considerably less valuable as an acquisition. Moreover,
the sudden shutdown of the trading system made it unclear how many
customers would return when the power went back on. In such a
world, a bankruptcy judge must simply do the best she can. It is a
testimony to the flexibility and creativity of the modern bankruptcy
bench that the judges administering the Enron case were able to
orchestrate such sales and ensure that they took place within a few
weeks.
Enron has already sold its main natural gas pipeline. Before
entering into Chapter 11, it tried to engineer a takeover by its
competitor, Dynergy. As part of the transaction, Enron promised that
were the acquisition talks to collapse, it would sell its pipeline to
Dynergy.8 4 The talks did in fact collapse, and Dynergy took control of
the pipeline.8 5 Just before it filed for bankruptcy, Enron agreed to sell

81. See Ann Davis, Want Some Extra Cash? File for Chapter 11: 'Pay to Stay' Bonuses Are
Common at Busted Tech Firms, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2001, at C1.
82. See In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034, 2001 Bankr. Lexis 1563, at *4, *7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 3, 2001).
83. See FuSARo & MILLER, supra note 21, at 178.
84. Dynergy to Pay Enron a $25 Million Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2002, at C4.
85. Dynergy, which subsequently encountered its own financial troubles, sold the pipeline
in the summer of 2002 to legendary investor Warren Buffett. See Kathryn Kranhold, Enron
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its wholly owned subsidiary Portland General Electric to Northwest
Natural Gas Company for $1.9 billion.8 6 While this sale ultimately
was not completed because of complications arising from the
bankruptcy proceeding, this asset is currently on the block.8 7 Eleven
other Enron subsidiaries are also on the block. 88 Other assets have
already found buyers. Enron's wind operations have been sold to
General Electric.8 9
Enron's new CEO has proposed moving Enron's pipeline and
energy business, the type of assets on which Enron was founded in
1985, out of bankruptcy and into a new company. 90 Enron's new
managers and creditors apparently believe that Enron's disparate
assets will fetch the highest price if sold separately. This conclusion
should not be surprising. The new Chief Executive Officer is a
specialist in selling distressed assets, not in running a going concern.
The large array of assets that came into the bankruptcy court when
Enron filed its petition is systematically being turned into cash. Thus,
the questions addressed in Enron's reorganization will focus largely
upon dividing assets among many claimants.
Enron is the twenty-first century's parallel to the latenineteenth-century railroads. They too had their share of fraud and
corruption. 91 They also had capital structures that took years to
unravel. Much of the railroad reorganization business, however,
required judicial oversight of the railroad's operations and their
restructuring. This aspect of the equity receivership was necessary
only because the capital markets of the time were insufficient to allow

Takes Bid on Major Assets, Adding to a Glut, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2002, at B3, available at 2002
WL-WSJ 3404659.
86. See Robin Sidel, Northwest NaturalBuys Enron Unit for $1.9 Billion in Cash and Stock,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2001, at A4, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2877908.
87. See Press Release, Enron Corp., Enron Commences Auction Process to Maximize Value
of Core Assets, (Aug. 27, 2002), available at http:lwww.enron.comlcorplpressroomlreleasesl2002/ene/29-082702ReleaseLtr.html.
88. Id.
89. Jeff St. Onge & Christopher Mumma, $358 Million Wind-Asset Sale to GE Is Approved,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Apr. 11, 2002, available at LEXIS, Bloomberg-All Bloomberg News.
90.

See Press Release, Enron Corp., Enron Presents Process to Creditors' Committee for

Separating Power, Pipeline Company from Bankruptcy, (May 3, 2002),
http://www.enron.com/corp/pressroom/releases/2002/ene/23-O50302ReleaseLtr.html

available at
(last visited

Aug. 21, 2002); see also Neela Banerjee, Enron to Sell Major Units to Raise Cash for Settlements,

N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2002, at C1.
91. For a description of the events surrounding nine of the largest railroad reorganizations,
see
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marketplace sales of the assets. 92 Today, however, firms can muster
the billions needed to buy Enron's hard assets or serve as a reliable
counterparty for its trading operations.
The fourth lesson of Enron is again a simple one. Markets for
the assets of large firms exist in a way they did not at the time the law
of corporate reorganization came into being. Shortly before it filed for
Chapter 11, Enron controlled 25% of a trading volume that measured
many billions of dollars. 93 Its working capital itself ran in the
billions.9 4 But it could cease its trading operations without creating
even a ripple in the marketplace. When the trading operation that had
purportedly generated billions in profits was put up for sale, no cash
bidders appeared. The absence of a cash bid for its trading operations
did not raise concern about the liquidity of markets, but rather new
doubts about the underlying value of Enron's operation. With respect
to large firms in reorganization, liquidity constraints and the inability
to raise sufficient capital can no longer justify a law of corporate
reorganizations.
V. CONCLUSION

Enron was not a Ponzi scheme. Money from late-arriving
investors was not used to pay off those who arrived earlier. But Enron
and Ponzi do have two features in common. First, the bankruptcy
itself was precipitated by the failure of investors to understand that
extraordinary profits from financial intermediation, to the extent they
exist, disappear in competition. Second, the primary business of
bankruptcy is not to save or rehabilitate firms, but to allocate losses
after the assets are sold. The business of making such decisions,
especially in the presence of fraud, is a hard business, but it is one in
which our bankruptcy judges are especially skilled.
Enron's story has cast a shadow over nearly everyone
associated with it, from politicians to accountants, but the bankruptcy
bench and the modern Chapter 11 process may be a striking
exception. Judges in Delaware and elsewhere have transformed
Chapter 11 just as judges in the nineteenth century transformed the
then-arcane equity receivership. Bankruptcy judges no longer pretend
to possess the wisdom to chart the destiny of great corporations. Nor
does Chapter 11 provide a chance for investors to sit down and spend
years pondering the fate of a large firm. But the new face of large-firm
92.

See Jerome N. Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate

Reorganization, 19 VA. L. REV. 541, 554 (1933).
93.

2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 9.

94.

See id. at 32.
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bankruptcy practice, one that began only a few years ago in Delaware,
may give us something to celebrate. Judges and markets work hand in
glove, each doing their work in the arena in which they operate best.
This observation is another, and perhaps the most reassuring, lesson
95
from Enron.

95. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 24 (manuscript at 43-61) (developing this theme at
greater length).

